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Discussion After The Speeches of Joel Davidow
and Lawson Hunter
QUESTION, Professor King: There's a political world around us.
It is conceivable, because we have elections, that there may be a change,
at least in the United States, in 1988. I don't think that this is carved in
stone. I wanted to ask Joel Davidow what he foresees as the possible
changes in the event that there is a transfer of power from the Republi-
cans to the Democrats?
We see people like Senator Metzenbaum, a Democrat from Ohio,
introducing legislation on antitrust. We have many people who are vigi-
lant in this area. I don't think that this is cast in concrete. What does
this mean in terms of the future?
ANSWER, Mr. Davidow: There was a conference held at Airlie
House early in 1987 which was roughly called an Antitrust Policy for a
Democratic Administration. The fact that it required a whole confer-
ence and a lot of papers indicated that the issue was not simple. The
critique of some of the past rules was sufficiently strong that some of
them-such as, alleging conspiracies between a parent and a subsidiary,
or of allowing firms that only have three percent of the market to be
charged with attempt to monopolize-will probably never come back.
The critique is so devastating that it doesn't matter what administration
comes in. The old policies won't come back.
On the other hand, there is a hostility to antitrust enforcement,
which is part of a hostility to government in the Reagan Administration,
and I think it will change. The Reagan budget calls for a cut of 100
enforcement positions in the antitrust division of the Securities and Ex-
change Commission (S.E.C.). It is clear to me that the Democratic Con-
gress will reject that cut and that a Democratic president would not be
interested in cutting the size of antitrust.
President Reagan had proposed, or was willing to study, legislation
that would do away with mandatory treble damages and replace them
with discretionary damages or even no damages in certain cases. I think,
except possibly in the area of foreign trade, that the Democratic Con-
gress is not about to do away with treble damages, so there is no substan-
tial difference there. Interestingly, because of some concern about
takeover abuses, I think there may be some minor strengthening in the
antitrust laws in regard to longer waiting periods under Scott or Rodino
and a greater control on the use of special partnerships to buy up other
companies, with the partnership avoiding the corporate regulation.
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That, of course, could probably be done by the Federal Trade Commis-
sion on its own.
On merger control, I could foresee some minor differences. Merger
control started as being involved largely with mergers that were threaten-
ing to become monopolies. At the high point of merger control in the
U.S. Supreme Court, the government was able to break up a supermarket
merger that involved perhaps eight percent of the market. The typical
figure now is probably closer to 20% of the market. I would not expect
to see that figure go back down very far, though there is perhaps a
greater sensitivity on the part of democrats to giant size; that is, if you
have two multibillion dollar oil companies with 14% of the market be-
tween them, would you sue them? I think maybe a Democratic president
might and a Republican might not, although it is hard to say, because it
depends on whether you look at the size or at the market share. So I
would expect differences in resources and in spirit, but only minor differ-
ences in doctrine.
QUESTION, Mr. Herman: I have a question for either of the two
speakers. In the context of the trade negotiations, there has been, as I
understand it, consideration given to replacing anti-dumping measures
with some alternative kind of procedure. Conceptually you could deal
with anti-dumping in the Canada/U.S. context through competition law.
Given what Lawson Hunter has said about some of the similarities on the
substantive side-and I think the logic of his presentation is that you can
harmonize the systems-the result could be to use antitrust and competi-
tion law as a means of dealing with the dumping problem.
Going back to the Canadian objectives in the free trade talks, one of
the most important Canadian objectives is to try to reduce or eliminate
the harassment effect of anti-dumping laws against Canadian exports. If
you have some kind of North American competition law system, explicit
in which is reciprocal access to the courts or the procedures of both
countries to deal with anti-dumping problems through competition law,
one immediately has to ask whether we have accomplished the Canadian
objective; the objective of eliminating or reducing the harassment effect
of aggressive U.S. entrepreneurs who like to litigate, or tend to like to
litigate, as a corporate objective in dealing with competition.
I want to ask the question as to whether the kind of system that
seems to be in vestige would solve the problem that Canadians are con-
cerned about or would exacerbate that very problem?
ANSWER, Mr. Lawson Hunter: Well, I think there are two sides of
the question, at least from my point of view. First is the question of
substantive law; I think that you would have to harmonize the two price
discrimination laws. The price discrimination laws in the competition
context, imperfect though they are now, are better than the anti-dumping
laws. They make more economic sense. But they are not identical and I
would be inclined to make changes. However, I don't want to underesti-
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mate the difficulty of doing that, because small businessmen generally
view the price discrimination laws as their salvation.
Second, I would drop the cost justification rule in the U.S. law and
rely only on a quantity test as the Canadian law does. I would add a
meeting competition test to the Canadian law and I would add a require-
ment to the Canadian law that there be some impact on the competition.
I think you could make changes that would make the laws similar.
Now, a cynic might say the impact of those changes would be to
make the price discrimination laws less enforceable than they already
are; but I guess if I sit back and say "what would be a sensible price
discrimination law," those would be the things that I would examine.
If these changes were made, how would Canadian businessmen be
able to use those laws? Will they be subject to litigation, which is more
likely in the United States, in an attempt to enforce those laws, more so
than they could do in a reciprocal way in Canada? I think the answer to
that is yes, and that's why you have to temper any new laws with some
adjustments to the institutional regime that in the United States encour-
ages private litigation. Without that, I think there is certainly a prospect
that U.S. businessmen would just switch from the anti-dumping laws to
the price discrimination laws as a means to protect their position in the
U.S. market.
Now, one of the reasons that I quoted those figures on the private
cases and the trend in the use of the courts in the United States to enforce
price discrimination laws is to show that they have been on the decline.
They are less significant than they used to be; but nevertheless they are
still significant figures.
On the Canadian side, if I were a Canadian businessman, I would
say I want a little easier route to use the price discrimination laws in
Canada. I don't know how you go about doing that. If you could arrive
at some joint institututional system that deals with costs and discovery,
etc., you would have the same regime and the Canadian businessman
would have equal access. I think you can harmonize the laws, but I
think you have got to do something to make the playing field more level
on the private enforcement side.
COMMENT, Mr, Davidow: I think it is surprising that in his an-
swer, Lawson Hunter left out one of his favorite topics, which is jurisdic-
tion. The advantage of the dumping law is that you can use it against a
foreigner who has never entered your country. You might not get a hold
of the foreigner, but the dumping laws are in rem statutes. If you are an
American and you find that some Canadian is selling products below
cost, and he's not in the United States to sue, just sue the goods.
By means of the dumping laws, you get two advantages. One, the
government does the litigating for you, so you don't have to pay the legal
fees after you have filed your petition. Two, you don't ever have to get a
hold of the defendant. You just have to put a tariff on the goods. If you
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did what is done in the Common Market and treated transborder sales as
domestic sales not subject to the trade laws, you would create a different
world; a world in which people in Canada or in the United States could
sell into the other country at allegedly predatory or below costs prices
and there would be no clear remedy.
I think the Americans would have some remedies in the Wilson
Tariff Act or Section 337, if those were stated in fact, because both are, in
a way, in rem statutes; although they have a much higher standard of
injury. I'm not sure that Canada has a similar statute that could be used,
in essense, against the goods, as opposed to against the named defendant.
I think that, at the moment, there isn't a lot of groundwork laid for a
substitute for the anti-dumping laws either way. You would either have
to lay a groundwork for a substitute system of enforcement or make a
major intellectual case that the issue was unimportant, that predatory
pricing is too rare to care about. The alternative is to try to negotiate
some really substantial changes, substantive tests in the anti-dumping
laws.
COMMENT, Mr. Yosowitz: I think that you can work to eliminate
price discrimination laws, which a lot of people in the United States
think are silly, and you said you would harmonize them in such a way
that would make them effective. I think also, though, that there is hardly
any realistic possibility of changing the procedural laws or the U.S. anti-
trust laws in the context of a trade law negotiation. If you lower the
tariffs and allow the Canadian businessmen to come in, they have to
compete on the same basis as the U.S. businessmen. I don't think that
you can have a special law that would affect only Canadians. I'm not
sure if that's what you had in mind, but I don't think that you could
effect that.
There are currently many types of U.S. attempts to lower treble
damages from Division B class actions. All of this, in the context of the
whole law, is being worked on right now. I don't think that you can have
any particular separate actions that way.
QUESTION, Mr. David Hunter: My question touches upon a point
Mr. Herman raised and to which Lawson Hunter responded. There have
been several comments made by U.S. negotiators or officials that U.S.
trade remedy law is not negotiable and I'm not sure if by that they mean
on the substantive side or the procedural side. Presuming the trade rem-
edy law to be nonnegotiable, what is left for negotiation?
ANSWER, Mr. Davidow: Reduction of tariffs.
QUESTION, Mr. David Hunter: And that's it?
ANSWER, Mr. Lawson Hunter: I think Mr. Davidow is right-
reduction of tariffs and that's about it. My sense of the Canadian govern-
ment's position is that reduction of tariffs is not enough and there has to
be some accommodation to the protection side. Now, whether meaning-
ful changes can be achieved is a good question. How important is it?
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The man who commented just before seemed to say that-maybe he was
only talking about antitrust-he wasn't worried about being harassed.
My impression of some Canadian businesses is that they feel they would
be harassed by the contingency protection system, if not the antitrust
laws.
If that's not true, then we should not be worrying about it. But if
there is the potential that either the contingency protection system or, if
it doesn't apply to U.S./Canadian trade, the antitrust laws can be used to
prevent the operation and freer operation of markets in the entry of each
other's businesses to the other domestic economy, and then it just isn't
going to work.
QUESTION, Mr. David Hunter: Just one follow up; is there a way
to divide procedure from substance? I'm talking now in terms of CVD,
where you attempted to define what acceptable subsidies are, while leav-
ing the procedural mechanism in place.
ANSWER, Mr. Lawson Hunter: Well, on countervailing, there will
be a later panel that is going to talk about that. It strikes me that there is
no equivalent in the domestic competition law on subsidy because it is a
governmental action. I think the substantive law there is more important
than the dumping side where, in my view, you have to worry about the
substantive law and the procedural law.
QUESTION, Mr. Magnus: I would just like to follow up on your
response to Mr. Herman. Did I understand you to suggest that the price
discrimination provisions are, you feel, more effective than the anti-
dumping provisions? Is that because you see a lack of harmonization
between the anti-dumping provisions in Canada and the United States?
QUESTION, Mr. Lawson Hunter: Did you say more effective?
ANSWER, Mr. Magnus: That's what I thought I understood you to
say.
ANSWER, Mr. Lawson Hunter: I guess I would say they reflect
better policy. They reflect the rationale of public policy in an economic
sense. It makes more sense to me-even in their current state, which
most people don't think is perfect-than do the anti-dumping laws. I
think the anti-dumping laws are clearly and exclusively, as far as I can
see, aimed at preventing competition based on international price dis-
crimination and they don't make much economic sense.
COMMENT, Mr. Magnus: I can understand that from a policy
standpoint. In terms of harmonization, though, if we were going price
discrimination versus anti-dumping, I would suggest there is more har-
mony between the anti-dumping processes of the two countries than in
price discrimination.
COMMENT, Mr. Lawson Hunter: You are right about that. The
two anti-dumping laws are very clear.
QUESTION, Mr. Rosenthal: I found Mr. Davidow's criticism sur-
prising; surprising that it would be difficult to get jurisdiction in the U.S.
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law if you brought a price discrimination action against what would have
been dumping before dumping was abolished in U.S./Canada trade.
The Supreme Court just recently came down with a decision in the
Asaki case where the Court said if you sell goods intending that they be
resold in the United States knowing that they will be resold in the United
States, there is personal jurisdiction in the United States. I can see that
Canadian law has to be modified to assert jurisdiction in the other way,
but I don't see any need for a change in the U.S. law to assert personal
jurisdiction over a price discriminator in the Northwest Territory for
selling his goods in the United States.
ANSWER, Mr. Davidow: There was a remark by one of the presi-
dents where he said, "Mr. Marshall has made his decision, now let him
enforce it." You can have personal jurisdiction over a foreign seller in
the limited sense that the court says that you can serve an empty chair
and seat an empty chair, but that's also an empty purse.
COMMENT, Mr. Rosenthal: That's not true if you can get a default
judgment that can block the goods from coming into the United States.
COMMENT, Mr. Davidow: Well, again, if you are looking for
money for past damage because you are out of business and the foreigner
is not present, you would have the possibility of seeking enforcement of
the judgment in Canada. My understanding, however, is that the treat-
ment of antitrust judgments is that the Hague Convention on the recipro-
cal enforcement of judgments is generally not accepted in antitrust cases.
Of course, Canada has gone out of its way to suggest that it reserves the
right not to give full faith and credit to antitrust judgments.
COMMENT, Mr. Rosenthal: Under its blocking law, the federal
government reserves the right to frustrate the penal portion of the en-
forcement of the damage award, but I don't know of any Canadian law
or policy which frustrates the enforcement of antitrust judgments across
the board. Whether there is such a policy or not, I don't see that remov-
ing the dumping laws, while preserving the remedy which the 1921 Act
dumping law provides- i.e., being able to prevent the goods from com-
ing into the United States except at an acceptable nonprice discrimina-
tory price- puts you any further back than you would be if you still had
the dumping laws in place.
QUESTION, Mr. Bilder: I guess we all know that the antitrust laws
in the past have been, particularly with the United States, a matter of
territorial enforcement and controversy. I was wondering if either of the
speakers could comment on the degree to which territorial enforcement
has been used for harassment in the past. Aside from the questions of
sensitivity and sovereignty, has the use of the antitrust laws by the U.S.
government in private concerns really had a substantial impact on Cana-
dian businesses? Has it been a major factor, in practical terms, in the
past? Has it been used for harassment or is it mainly the other sort of
issues-sovereignty, etc.-that have been involved in the conflict?
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ANSWER, Mr. Davidow: First of all, I'm bewildered by the idea
that U.S./Canadian trade is now the largest body of trade in the world.
Seventy percent of the trade already occurs in a free trade zone. Will
putting the other 30% in free trade zone change the competitive or anti-
trust implication at all? It doesn't change the nature or form of the trade
or the basic legislative framework.
One can always make the opposite point that in a negotiation, there
is an opportunity to harmonize or an opportunity to improve the kind of
free trade that has been achieved. That is quite a different question than
to say there is a great danger if you take away the other 30% of the
tariffs, that it is going to create a different trading system. It isn't; it is
the same trading system. Just a few more industries have lower tariffs
than they had before.
About the word "harassment," I had thought the major issue was
harassment through the use of U.S. trade laws. In fact, the Japanese
have felt that there have been instances where, in a single product like
television sets, they have been sued privately, then by the government,
then under the dumping rules, and then under section 301. Every time
the U.S. plaintiff has lost the case, he has picked another U.S. statute and
sued again and ran up enormous legal bills for the Japanese. There have
been some speeches, going back to one by Mr. Rosenthal, which suggest
that a U.S. commitment to free trade should be a commitment against
allowing or facilitating that kind of harassment.
A recent example is that the Federal Trade Commission, under the
prodding of Commissioner Calvani, has opened an investigation of a ce-
ment dumping prosecution. I think it involved cement from Canada to
the United States. The argument was that the anti-dumping claim was
frivolous and that there should be a conspiracy prosecution of the Ameri-
cans who filed a baseless action in order to harass their foreign competi-
tors. The harassment, I think, comes out more in the trade laws and, in
this case, antitrust laws become a weapon the other way.
QUESTION, Mr. Miller: I'm from the Department of Finance in
Ottawa, and my question may reflect my nonlegal background. We have
been making a distinction here between price discrimination and preda-
tion within the Competition Act; that is fairly easily distinguishable
among the various provisions. On the U.S. side, I'm not so clear that the
distinction can be quite so clearly made. In the case of the Sherman Act,
I think section 2-A deals with pricing behavior and attempts to monopo-
lize or obtain monopoly power. Is it also the case under the Robinson-
Patman Act that if you were looking at the primary line competitive in-
jury, that you would be talking about predation in that case as well?
ANSWER, Mr. Davidow: I'm not sure the word "predation" does a
great deal for me, but I think the difference is whether you look at injury
in a quantitative substantiation, or whether you look at threat to the mar-
ket or threat of monopoly. Clearly the difference between the dumping
law and the antitrust law, almost from the beginning, has been that the
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dumping law's definition of injury has included something about more
than minimal damages. For example, if you have three percent of the
market, then you dump and get four, you can lose a dumping case if that
one percent of the market is viewed as quantitatively substantial. On the
other hand if somebody charged you, under an antitrust law, with having
three percent of the market and then achieving four, you probably would
win. Clearly the dumping law is not concerned with the ultimate prob-
lem of whether the consumer will face a monopoly. It is concerned with
the immediate welfare of the domestic producer who had to compete
with your price discrimination. In that sense, the dumping law is just
infinitely stricter in its terms.
COMMENT, Professor King: I want to thank you both for an ex-
tremely far-reaching session.
8
Canada-United States Law Journal, Vol. 12 [1987], Iss. , Art. 10
https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/cuslj/vol12/iss/10
